For nearly five centuries, modern science has gradually chipped away at the notion that we live in a meaningful world. We occupy a remote tiny planet in an otherwise prosaic corner of a massive and expanding universe that our species has come to dominate through a remarkably contingent and fortunate series of events. But our bodies, our species, and even the planet itself will ultimate crumble. Our death is inevitable, and we cannot know the time it will come. At best, we can hope that it will be brief and relatively painless.
It would probably be surprising to many laypeople that simply reading and thinking about the previous paragraph, and then distracting themselves from it for a short interval through some other task, might be enough to cause at least some readers to espouse, for example, more pro-nationalist or pro-religious sentiments than they otherwise might (a so-called 'worldview defence'; for reviews and a meta-analysis of this body of work, see Burke, Martens, and Faucher, 2010; Greenberg, Solomon, and Arndt, 2008; Hayes et al., 2010) . The typical claim when such an effect is observed is that it reminded readers of their mortality (engendered so-called 'mortality salience'), which in turn engaged terror management (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1997) or possibly meaning maintenance mechanisms (Heine, Proulx, and Vohs, 2006; Proulx and Heine, 2006) to maintain adaptive functioning.
1 It is probably no coincidence that concerns about mortality are among what Hume called 'the ordinary affections of human life', namely 'the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries' that he took to be essential for the flourishing of human religions (Hume, 1957, p. 166) .
A source of considerable justification and perhaps even pride for researchers interested in the empirical investigation of these issues seems to lie in the desire to take the often woolly concepts of Western existentialism, psychoanalytic thought, and earlier historical speculation like Hume's and run them though the lathe of a thoroughgoing experimental psychology. For example, Koole, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski (2006), advocates of what they call 'experimental existential psychology', note that:
The human struggle with the givens of existence has captured the imagination of poets, prophets, and philosophers across the ages. Experimental psychologists are now studying people's existential concerns using the rigorous methods of psychological science. (Koole, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski., 2006, p. 215) However, the precision of experimentation is useful to the extent that one is studying a phenomenon that is conceptually adequate, in the sense that the concepts we use to reference it are not plagued by too much conceptual ambiguity. One significant risk is that the concepts of existential philosophy or psychoanalytic thought might live in conceptual spaces that are mostly independent of those of interest to experimental psychologists. If so, such concepts can take on meanings that not only do not make the same sense when placed in their new context, but rather have no clear sense at all because their meanings are ambiguous.
In this spirit, our goal in this chapter is not to review the empirical findings that exist in this literature or to assay their methodological adequacy, but rather to examine the theoretical statements in this area with respect to their conceptual adequacy. Our goal will be to perform a case study sort of conceptual analysis of the two main explanations of these findings in the social psychological literature. We focus on the most fundamental concept, namely 'meaning', which we paraphrase as 'psychological meaning' to make it explicit that the concern of these researchers is with the experience (conscious or otherwise) of meaning, and not simply with the fact that one thing might mean another, or the like. 
The roots of psychological meaning
The interdisciplinary anthropologist Ernest Becker (1971, 1973) argued that much of our psychological experience is organized to avoid and
